

Complement Clause with the Verb *Know*: *You* as “ Object of Conceptualization ” or “ Subject of Conceptualization ”?

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Abstract

This paper examines the cases where complement clauses with the verb *know* have the second person as their sentence subject. With the verb *know*, which is one of the factive predicates, truth of complements is generally presupposed (Kiparsky & Kiparsky, 1970), and even when the main clauses are negated the complements are not. Langacker sheds some light on this specific feature of factivity by presupposing two layers of conceptualization. In case of the verb *know*, if the main clauses are negated the complements are not because the proposition is “independently accessible to the speaker and accepted as being valid” (Langacker, 2002, pp. 203-204). When the sentence subject is *you*, however, there are anomalous cases where the propositions do not stay as valid if the main clauses are negated. Thus, this paper proposes two types of complement clauses with the verb *know*: type A in which factivity is kept intact; type B in which the feature of factivity is lost. The objective of this paper is to elucidate how such a difference in factivity is brought about. Each type is explicated based on the intersubjective view and the construal configuration of Verhagen (2005, 2007). This paper argues that type A represents the cases where the second person’s cognitive state is profiled as the object of conceptualization at the objective level; type B, on the other hand, represents the cases that profile the coordination relation between the speaker and the hearer, with respect to the same object of conceptualization.

Keywords: complement clause, factive verb *know*, intersubjectivity,
sentence subject *you*

Introduction

This paper examines the cases where complement clauses with the cognitive verb *know* have the second person as their sentence subject. With the verb *know*, which is one of the factive predicates, truth of complements is generally presupposed (Kiparsky & Kiparsky, 1970); and therefore even when the main clause is negated, the status of the subordinate-clause proposition is unchanged

(Langacker, 2002, 2009). The following examples show this property of the factive verb *know*. In (1a) the subordinate-clause proposition “Alice is unhappy” is presupposed to be true, while in (1b), even though the main clause is negated the proposition is not.

- (1) a. Joe *knows* that Alice is unhappy.
- b. Joe *doesn't know* that Alice is unhappy.

Now look at example (2), where the main clause subject is the second person.

- (2) *You don't know that* I spend large amounts of my free time working on costumes for various conventions....
(<http://poniesforparents.tumblr.com/post/85035719264>)

As with example (1b), in (2) the truth of the subordinate proposition is presupposed in spite of the main clause being negated. That is, the proposition “I spend large amounts of the free time working on costumes for various conventions” is presented as a fact.

However, there are other cases where the subordinate-clause propositions do not stay as valid when the main-clauses are negated. Let us look at the examples in (3).

- (3) a. ... it's a good idea to have more than one executor because *you don't know* that your executor is going to survive you. (BNCC)
- b. And, besides, *you don't know* that those diamonds are real. They could be glass. (COCA)

In (3a)¹, the proposition “your executor is going to survive you” is not presupposed as true. Since the speaker believes the possibility that the executor might not live as long as the hearer, the speaker claims that the hearer should have

¹ When the speaker is not sure about the truth of the proposition, whether-clause or if-clause are also used as follows.

- (3) a'. ... it's a good idea to have more than one executor because *you don't know whether/if* your executor is going to survive you.

Compared to (3a') above, sentences with a that-clause such as (3a) are regarded as rather informal expressions. However, according to an informant, other than formality, a slight but significant difference is felt between (3a) and (3a'). In (3a), the speaker seems to assume that the hearer believes the executor is going to live longer than him/her. On the other hand, in (3a'), there is no such assumption.

more than one executor. Likewise, in (3b), the speaker is suggesting the possibility that the diamonds are glass. Clearly, the proposition “those diamonds are real” is not presented as a fact. To sum up, in cases of (3a) and (3b), where the main clause subjects are the second person *you*, the property of factivity is lost. This means that the same sentence form *you don’t know* displays different features in respect to factivity depending on the context.

Thus, this paper proposes two types of complement clauses with the verb *know* as in table 1.

Table 1 Type A vs. Type B

you don’t know that+P	Factivity	Examples
Type A	+	(2)
Type B	-	(3a), (3b)

Type A refers to cases where factivity is kept intact as in (2); type B refers to cases in which the feature of factivity is lost when the main clause is negated as in (3a) and (3b). Some other examples that are categorized into either of the two types are listed in the appendix. The objective of this paper is to elucidate how such a difference in factivity between the two types is brought about. In other words, I want to make it clear how the two different semantic features are expressed by the same form *you don’t know*.

In the next section, Langacker’s model of Control Cycle is examined to determine whether it adequately answers the question of the present paper.

Factivity and Langacker's Control Cycle

In this section, Langacker’s model of the control cycle is introduced in order to examine if it can explicate how the property of factivity is brought about.

Achard (1998) claims that “[t]he knowledge of something is a matter of agreement between the subject of the knowledge verb and the authority who assumes responsibility for the validity of the proposition expressed in the complement” (Achard, 1998, p. 240). He maintains that with verbs of knowledge the main clause conceptualizer and the speaker share the complement proposition “in their respective conceptions of elaborated reality” (1998, p. 241). On the basis of Achard’s view, Langacker (2002, 2009) further argues that this feature of factivity will be accounted for by presupposing two layers of conceptualization: one layer is subjectively construed and the other is objectively construed. In the

former, it is the speaker (C_0) who conceptualizes the whole situation and presents it; in the latter, the conceptualizer (C_1) is the sentence subject, who plays the role of the subject of conceptualization in the objective layer, as well as the object of conceptualization of the speaker. This is illustrated in Fig.1.




Fig. 1 Two Layers of Conceptualization

(Langacker, 2009, p. 272)

Bringing the idea of the two layers of conceptualization into his model of the control cycle, Langacker sheds some light on factivity of the verb *know*. As follows, he contrasts the verb *know* with the verb *believe*, a non-factive verb.

- (4) a. Eric *believes* that beer prevents cancer.
- b. Eric *knows* that beer prevents cancer. (Langacker, 2002, p. 203)
- (5) Eric *doesn't know* that beer prevents cancer.

In the case of the non-factive verb *believe* in (4a), the sentence subject Eric (C_1) accepts as real the proposition *beer prevents cancer* (P_1), which is illustrated in Fig. 2 (a). This is depicted by the line between C_1 and P_1 in the objective layer. At the same time, in the subjective layer, the speaker (C_0) holds the proposition (P_0) that Eric entertains this belief. Since the speaker and his/her belief stay off-stage, it remains implicit. Only C_1 , the proposition P_1 and the line between the two are overtly expressed, as indicated in bold.

On the other hand, in case of the factive verb *know* in (4b), unlike in the case of the verb *believe*, there are two lines connected to the speaker C_0 . This is illustrated in Fig. 2 (b). The first line is connected from the speaker to the proposition P_0 , that is, Eric accepts as real the proposition P_1 . This line demonstrates that the speaker holds the overall proposition P_0 . The second line is connected from the speaker directly to P_1 , that is, *beer prevents cancer*. This second line indicates that the proposition P_1 is “independently accessible to the speaker and accepted as being valid” (Langacker 2002, p. 204). Thus, in the case

of the verb *know*, if the main clauses are negated as in (5), the complements are not because the speaker has direct access to the complement proposition. In this way, the specific feature of factivity is explicated in Langacker’s model of the control cycle.




Fig. 2 Non-Factive Verb vs. Factive Verb

(Langacker, 2002, p. 204)

Now let us consider if Langacker’s model can explicate the two types proposed in this paper. As indicated, the factivity observed in type A can be accounted for in the illustration of Fig. 2 (b). On the other hand, type B would be obviously anomalous for Langacker’s model. In type B the proposition is not presupposed by the speaker, and therefore the line connecting C_0 and P_1 disappears.

Thus we need a model that gives an explanation for a broader range of cases including both type A and type B. In the next section, Verhagen’s intersubjective view and his construal configuration will be introduced.

Verhagen (2005, 2007) and the Intersubjective View

The Construal Configuration

When human beings learn about the world, they “learn about the world ‘through’ others, and not only via their personal interaction with the environment” (Verhagen, 2005, p. 3). Thus, in regard to the analysis of linguistic phenomena, Verhagen emphasizes the importance of human beings’ ability to take into account other minds in relation to an object of conceptualization and to engage in deep cognitive coordination with others. This he calls “intersubjectivity,” and maintains

that:

... For a range of linguistic phenomena which are arguably quite basic (negation and negation-related constructions, complementation, discourse connectives) it can be demonstrated that connecting, differentiating, and ‘tailoring’ the contents of points of view with respect to each other (rather than organizing a connection to the world) is essential for understanding their semantics and, perhaps surprisingly, their syntax (Verhagen, 2005, p. 4).

Accordingly, in his construal configuration, Verhagen proposes two conceptualizers as the “ground,” namely the speaker and the hearer, who take part in conceptualizing the situation. The speaker assumes the hearer’s viewpoint, based on which s/he invites the hearer to jointly attend to an object of conceptualization in some specific way and coordinate conceptualization. In this way, the participants of a discourse update the common ground between the two and increase the amount of their common knowledge. This is illustrated in Fig. 3.




Fig. 3 The Construal Configuration and its Basic Elements

(Verhagen, 2007)

In Fig. 3, the ground consists of conceptualizer 1 (the speaker) and conceptualizer 2 (the hearer). The vertical line between the ground and the object of conceptualization indicates “joint attention,” and the horizontal line between the two conceptualizers represents “coordination relation.”

This paper adopts this intersubjective view of Verhagen as the basis for the discussion. The following section will review Verhagen’s views of complement clauses.

Complement Clauses

This section examines Verhagen’s perspectives on complement clauses in terms of the intersubjective viewpoint. First, Verhagen (2005, 2007) is against the conventional view that complement clauses are subordinate to main clauses. Traditionally, complementation constructions have been assumed to be

subordinate to main clauses, having lower prominence than the main clauses². However, taking the intersubjective view, Verhagen claims that we should think of an utterance as a communicative event that includes the speaker and the hearer. Thus, an utterance such as “X thinks/promises/hopes that Y” should be taken as an “instruction from the speaker/writer to the addressee, that Y is to be conceptualized in a particular way” (2007, p. 97).

He clarifies this idea through the following example: the conversation between speaker A and speaker B takes place at 2 p.m. and the distance to the launch site is one mile.

(6) A: Will we be in time for the launch?

B1: It was scheduled for 4 p.m.

B2: I think it was scheduled for 4 p.m.

(Verhagen, 2005, p. 105)

In the above, for speaker B, either utterance B1 or B2 is a possible response to answer A’s question. Furthermore, in this context both answers will infer a positive answer, that is, “yes, we will probably be in time.” Pointing out that in B2 it is the complement clause that will make such an inference possible, Verhagen concludes that complement clauses function to profile the situation with at least the same degree of prominence as their main clauses.

Second, Verhagen argues that the ground can be profiled at the subjective level. Therefore, he maintains, the difference between B1 and B2 is that in B1 the speaker’s stance towards the content of the complement clause is expressed by the main clause. Based on this observation, he suggests that “complements contain the issues or claims discussed, while their CT-clauses in one way or another mark the speaker’s stance towards the issue or claim” (Verhagen, 2005, p. 105). As illustrated in Fig. 4, B1 is the case where the ground is not profiled; only the content at level O is profiled. On the other hand, in the case of B2, the ground, that is, the speaker’s perspective, is profiled in addition to the content at the objective level, which is illustrated in Fig. 5.

² Langacker (2009), although not from the perspective of traditional grammar, explains the subordination of complement clauses to main clauses in terms of “layering of mental spaces.” He argues that in a complement structure such as *Chris knows Doris left*, for example, *know* acts as the “space-builder” (Fauconnier, 1985), and the event of Doris leaving occupies the space. Thus, “a complement clause is subordinate to the matrix clause in the sense that the relationship it designates is embedded in a mental space which the matrix clause introduces” (Langacker, 2009, p. 330).




Fig. 4 Construal Configuration for Non-Perspectivized Utterance (B1)




Fig. 5 Construal Configuration for First-Person Perspective (B2)

(Verhagen, 2005, p. 106)

As evidence for the above discussion Verhagen (2007) introduces the study of Diessel and Tomasselo (2001). In their study of child language acquisition, they discuss that children’s first complement constructions are of the types such as *I think* and *you know*, which merely function as an epistemic marker or an attention getter. Based on this observation, Verhagen claims that in the early stage of language acquisition the complement-taking predicates that contain present-tense first-person and second-person expressions, such as *I think* and *you know*, “do not contribute to profiling an object of conceptualization; rather...only profiling (parts of) the ground” (Verhagen, 2007, p. 71).

In this section, complement clauses are examined in the light of the intersubjective perspective.

Negation

In the previous section, it was observed that in the case of expressions such as *I think* and *you know* the ground is profiled at the subjective level. This section examines how Verhagen (2005, 2007) analyzes negation in his intersubjective theory in order to understand the nature of negation observed in type B.

As was shown, Verhagen emphasizes the importance of human beings’ ability to take into account other minds, engaging in deep cognitive coordination with others. Based on this principle, he puts forward a new way of looking at negation, in which two opposite perspectives are involved, namely the view of the speaker (C1) and that of the hearer (C2). To illustrate this idea, Verhagen offers the following examples.

- (7) a. Mary is not happy.
 b. Mary is unhappy.

(Verhagen, 2007, p. 67)

(7a) and (7b) are equal in that both describe the situation relating to the concept of Mary’s happiness. However, Verhagen argues, sentence (7a) is not equal with (7b) in that it involves two distinct views with respect to the proposition *Mary is happy*. Put differently, example (7a) is the case where two “mental spaces” in the sense of Fauconnier (1985) are involved. In (7a), C1 (the speaker) assumes that C2 (the hearer) has an idea that *Mary is happy*; based on which C1 invites C2 to jointly attend to his/her own conceptualization, that is, *Mary is not happy*. In this way, C1 rejects C2’s conceptualization, replaces it with his/her own conceptualization and updates the common ground between the two. This is illustrated in Fig. 6. As shown, in the case of *not happy*, the two perspectives of the conceptualizers are profiled, as well as the coordination relation of the two. All the elements of the configuration are profiled as in Fig. 6.




Fig. 6 Construal Configuration for Coordination of Perspectives

(Verhagen, 2007, p. 68)

On the other hand, in the case of *unhappy*, those two mental spaces are not involved. This will be demonstrated by contrasting the following two examples. In (8a), with *not happy*, a discourse marker *on the contrary* sounds natural, while in (8b) the discourse marker would sound awkward.

- (8) a. Mary is not happy. On the contrary, she is feeling really depressed.
 b. #Mary is unhappy. On the contrary, she is feeling really depressed.

(Verhagen, 2007, p. 67)

In (8a), with the utterance “Mary is not happy”, the perspective of the hearer “Mary is happy” is evoked. Thus, the speaker’s use of the discourse marker *on the contrary* sounds appropriate to contrast his/her perspective with the hearer’s perspective. However, with *unhappy* such a mental space is not evoked. Accordingly, as in (8b), *on the contrary* would sound awkward as a discourse

marker.

In this section, Verhagen’s new way of viewing negation was shown. In the next section, the hypotheses of this paper are put forward.

The Hypotheses

The previous sections have shown how the complement structures and negation are viewed by Verhagen and illustrated in his construal configurations. This section proposes the hypotheses of this paper; type A and type B are illustrated in terms of Verhagen’s construal configuration.

The Hypotheses

Type A: The sentence subject *you* and his/her cognitive state of not knowing is profiled as the object of conceptualization at level O.

Type B: Not only the proposition at level O but also the joint-attention and the coordination relation between C1 (the speaker) and C2 (the hearer) of the ground are profiled at level S.




Fig. 7 Construal Configuration for Type A




Fig. 8 Construal Configuration for Type B

In the case of type A, the hearer’s ignorance of the proposition is described as an objective reality. The sentence subject *you* and his/her cognitive state “not knowing the proposition” is profiled as the object of conceptualization at level O, as in Fig. 7.

In the case of type B, on the other hand, two different views, namely C1’s

conceptualization and C2's conceptualization, are involved. Accordingly, not only the proposition at level O but also the joint-attention and the coordination relation between C1 and C2 of the ground are profiled at level S. As a result, all the parts are in bold as in Fig. 8.

Now let us see if the examples of the two types can be adequately explained by the hypotheses. First, let us look at the example (9).

- (9) *You don't know that* I spend large amounts of my free time working on costumes for various conventions.... (= (2))

Based on the hypothesis of type A, the whole proposition “*you don't know that* I spend large amounts of my free time working on costumes for various conventions...” is presented as an objective reality at level O. This interpretation is adequate and sound, because what the speaker in (9) is claiming is that the sentence subject *you* has no idea about the speaker's activities. Therefore, the hypothesis is regarded as valid.

Now, let us look at type B examples to see if the hypothesis is applicable and adequate.

- (10) a. ... it's a good idea to have more than one executor because *you don't know* that your executor is going to survive you. (= (3a))
b. And, besides, *you don't know that* those diamonds are real. They could be glass. (= (3b))

According to the hypothesis, two distinct viewpoints are involved in type B sentences. In fact, in example (10a), for example, two opposite perspectives are involved. One is the hearer's idea that executor is going to survive the client. The other is the speaker's idea that executor might not survive the client. Thus, with utterance (10a) the speaker is trying to reject the hearer's idea, replacing with his/her own view. In other words, not only the proposition at level O but also the joint-attention and the coordination relation are profiled at level S. Thus the hypothesis is considered as a valid one.

You Don't Know *It* vs. You Don't Know *That*

This section will overview some examples of sentences including *you don't know* with anaphoric expressions *it* and *that*. In doing so, parallelism will be observed between the contrast of type A with type B and that of “you don't know

it” with “you don’t know *that*.” In other words, “you don’t know *it*” corresponds to type A; while “you don’t know *that*” corresponds to type B. First, let us look at an example with *it* as follows.

(11) Loraine: Shut your filthy mouth. I’m not that kind of girl.

Biff: Well, maybe you are and you just don’t know *it/*that* yet.

(*Back to the future*)

Here, Biff, the speaker presents as a fact that Loraine does not know about her own nature. Put differently, the speaker describes the hearer’s ignorance as an objective reality. Thus, the sentence subject *you* and her cognitive state of “not knowing” is profiled at the objective level. This will be illustrated in Fig. 9, which corresponds to the configuration of type A of the present paper.

Next, look at the example with *that*. This is the case where two opposite viewpoints are involved.

(12) Kit: You definitely like him. Well, he’s not a bum. He’s a rich, classy guy.

Vivian: Who’s gonna break my heart, right?

Kit: No, no. Come on. You don’t know *that/*it*.

(*Pretty Woman*)

In (12), Vivian is afraid that she might end up being rejected by the man. Seeing this, Kit is trying to persuade her not to be too pessimistic. This is not a case where the speaker is describing the sentence subject’s ignorance of something. Instead, the speaker is trying to adjust the hearer’s way of understanding the situation to the view that the speaker holds towards the situation.

In fact, in the utterance *you don’t know that* in (12), two opposite views, which are entertained by the two conceptualizers, are involved. Conceptualizer 2, Vivian, has the conceptualization “the man is going to desert me.” Seeing this, conceptualizer 1, Kit, inviting conceptualizer 2, Vivian, to jointly attend to the opposite conceptualization of her own, rejects Vivian’s present conceptualization. Consequently, she builds a new ground for common knowledge. Thus, in (12), two perspectives of the two conceptualizers are profiled, as well as the coordination relation of the two interlocutors. All the elements of the configuration are profiled as in Fig. 10, which corresponds to the construal configuration for type B in the hypotheses.




Fig. 9 Construal Configuration for "you don't know *it*"




Fig. 10 Construal Configuration for "you don't know *that*"

(Nakashima, 2011a/b)

Conclusion

This paper analyzed two types of “you don’t know” with complement clauses, that is, type A with factivity and type B without factivity. It was shown that type A is the case where the hearer’s ignorance of the proposition is described as an objective reality. To put it more precisely, with type A the sentence subject *you* and his/her cognitive state “not knowing the proposition” is profiled as the object of conceptualization at level O. On the other hand, type B is the case in which two different views are involved, that is, one the speaker’s, the other the hearer’s. Accordingly, in type B not only the proposition at level O but also the joint-attention and the coordination relation between the speaker and the hearer are profiled at level S.

Appendix

The examples listed below are a few other cases for type A and B. The data are found in the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA).

Type A

1. “When you’re in high school, well, the school, your friends - they’re just your whole world.” “And you think they are the whole world,” said Louise. “*You don’t know* that there’s life after high school.”
2. But what if *you don’t know* that the device is in the car and that you’re being monitored?
3. The North Sea Jazz Festival held in Curacao this year was awesome. You think of the North Sea and *you don’t know* that it’s going to be hip. It was just beautiful, celebrating with a lot of different people.
4. *You don’t know* that I exist, of course, but I was happy just being there all alone and watching you, seeing you like an animal in a landscape, kicking
5. If *you don’t know* that your spouse or lover has the HI virus because no one will tell you, what you don’t know could kill you.
6. That’s the great genius of Washington the architect. *You don’t know* that those are the slave quarters. There are no doors, there are very small windows. He made it invisible.
7. I shall forgive you this time, he said, “because *you don’t know* that I’m your partner, according to the contract.”
8. If you think it’s stupid, you’re not from the East, and *you don’t know* that a little rain can turn boilerplate into silky corn -- if only for a short while.
9. When you first meet Christian, if you don’t see his prosthetic devices, *you don’t know* that he uses them.
10. You are clever but *you don’t know* that hidey-holes are best when they are in places no one looks.

Type B

1. Besides, *you don’t know that* he’ll spend the money on alcohol. Maybe he’s hungry. Maybe he wants a nice steak.
2. *You don’t know* that it’s a mockery. You don’t know what it is. Throw it away and forget about it.
3. *You don’t know* that she’s dead. Maybe there’s a chance to save her? Did you try to call 911?

4. “He’s real upset. He ain’t never gonna forgive me.” “*You don’t know* that he wouldn’t.” “I know” “You don’t know until you ask him.”
5. “Well,” she said. “Look, *you don’t know* that he took it. You don’t know anybody took it. Maybe it did fall off. Why don’t you drive back down toward the shop and look for it along the way?”
6. But *you don’t know* that it is an interface; *you don’t know* that it’s there for communication with you. Maybe that arms the weapons system. Maybe it vents the dilithium crystals.
7. But *you don’t know* that you’re even talking to the right issue unless you listen first to how the other person sees it.
8. “But *you don’t know* that there will be a happy ending to this story of yours.”
9. Well, how do you know that? *You don’t know* that every single one of them fled.
10. ...You might be, Karl. *You don’t know* that you wouldn’t be.” She argues back, a foot shorter than he, aiming the words at his head.

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